Volume 74
Issue 2 Dickinson Law Review - Volume 74,
1969-1970
1-1-1970

Conflict of Interests: Multiple Defendants Represented by a Single
Court-Appointed Counsel
Richard R. Isaacson

Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra

Recommended Citation
Richard R. Isaacson, Conflict of Interests: Multiple Defendants Represented by a Single Court-Appointed
Counsel, 74 DICK. L. REV. 241 (1970).
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol74/iss2/5

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu.

CONFLICT OF INTERESTS: MULTIPLE
DEFENDANTS REPRESENTED BY A
SINGLE COURT-APPOINTED COUNSEL
The sixth amendment establishes the right of an accused to
have the "Assistance of Counsel" for his defense.1 The United
States Supreme Court has declared (1) that this right extends to
all defendants regardless of their economic standing, and (2) that
this right mandates "effective" assistance of counsel.' Defining
what constitutes "effective" assistance is a difficult problem. 3 One
situation where the question of effective assistance arises is where
two or more criminal defendants are represented by the same
court-appointed counsel. In such a situation a conflict of interest
might develop.
It is established that an attorney cannot represent conflicting
interests.4 Three questions are basic to a discussion of conflicts
of interest. (1) What constitutes a conflict of interest? (2) If
a conflict of interest does arise, must prejudice ensue before the
defendant's constitutional rights have been violated? (3) What
are the respective roles of the accused, counsel, trial judge and
appellate-level courts involved in litigating the issue of conflict of
interests?
Because of recent United States Supreme Court decisions expanding the accused's right to counsel from arrest through sentencing and appeal, 5 the three basic conflict of interest questions
are appearing before the courts with increasing frequency. The
effect of finding a conflict of interest on appeal will often be a new
trial for a defendant, who might have been found guilty had the
conflict not been present. Thus, it is important that the uncertainties concerning conflicts of interest be answered and the potential
problems eliminated. This Comment will analyze the divergent
view taken by courts in answering the three basic conflict of interest questions and will offer a solution to the problem of multiple
defendants being represented by one court-appointed counsel.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI: "In all criminal proceedings, the accused
shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense."
2. See, e.g., Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942);
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45
(1932).
3. See generally Waltz, Inadequacy of Trial Defense Representation
as a Ground for Post-Conviction Relief in Criminal Cases, 59 Nw. U. L.
REv. 289 (1964).
4. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
5. Douglas v. Caifornia, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).

GLASSER"
7

Glasser v. United States is recognized as the leading authority
considering the problem of dual representation by one counsel.
Since the majority of courts considering the area of dual representation have based their opinion on the Glasser case, it is necessary
to review that decision.
Glasser and a co-defendant were convicted on a charge of conspiring to defraud the United States government. At the trial
Glasser's co-defendant voiced dissatisfaction with his counsel and
the court suggested that Glasser's attorney also represent his codefendant. Both Glasser and his attorney initially objected to
the dual representation on the grounds of a possible conflict of
interest, but the attorney later accepted the additional defendant
and Glasser did not again object. Glasser appealed, contending
that he was deprived of the assistance of counsel. The United
States Supreme Court reversed the conviction."
The Supreme Court held: "... 'the assistance of counsel' guaranteed by the sixth amendment contemplates that such assistance
be untrammeled and unimpared by a court order requiring that
one lawyer shall simultaneously represent conflicting interests.",
The Court also held that Glasser, though an attorney, had not
affirmatively waived his initial objection to sharing his counsel.
The Supreme Court said it would ". . . indulge every reasonable
presumption against the waiver of fundamental rights."' 0 The
Court placed upon the trial judge ". . the duty of seeing that the
trial is conducted with solicitude for the essential rights of the
accused,"" Some later courts' 2 have interpreted the language of
Glasser broadly and have held that a defendant does not waive
his right to separate counsel by failing to object and that it is the
duty of the trial court to discover if a conflict of interest does or
will exist.
Other courts 13 have looked at the Supreme Court language
in conjunction with the specific fact in Glasser that both the attorney and Glasser had objected to the dual appointment and had
6. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942), noted in 17 CALIF.
S.B.J. 42 (1942), 30 GEo. L.J. 570 (1942), 31 ILL. B.J. 71 (1942), 41 MICH.
L. REV. 321 (1942), 26 MINN. L. REV. 733 (1942), 16 TEMP. U. L.Q. 439
(1942), 9 U. CHI. L. Ray. 733 (1942).
7. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
8. Id. at 76.
9. Id. at 70.
10. Id. But see dissenting opinion: "[T]he fact that he [Glasser]
is an attorney with special experience in criminal cases, and not a helpless
illiterate, may be-as we believe it to be here-extremely relevant in
determining whether he was denied such protection." Id. at 89 (referring to
protection of the right to the effective assistance of counsel).
11. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 71 (1942).
12. See notes 77-87 infra and accompanying text.
13. See notes 91-99 infra and accompanying text.
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illustrated to the trial court the existence of a possible conflict
of interest. On this basis courts have held that a defendant waives
his rights to separate counsel if he does not object to the appointment of the same counsel for all defendants, and that it is the
duty of the defendant or his counsel to discover and bring to the
court's attention the presence of a conflict of interest. This viewpoint of placing a positive duty on the defendant to object to the
dual representation is strengthened by the language used by the
Supreme Court near the end of its discussion on the conflict of
interest issue: "Here the court was advised of the possibility that
conflicting interests might arise which would diminish Stewart's
usefulness to Glasser. Nevertheless, Stewart was appointed as
14
Kretske's counsel."
The case lends itself to further dual interpretation. When
discussing the issue of whether Glasser had been prejudiced by
the dual representation the court stated:
To determine the precise degree of prejudice sustained by
Glasser as a result of the court's appointment of Stewart as
counsel for Kretske is at once difficult and unnecessary.
The right to have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice
calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising from its
denial.1"
However, the Court later refused to reverse the conviction of his
co-defendant holding that:
To secure a new trial they must show that the denial of
Glasser's constitutional rights prejudiced them in some
manner, for where error as to one defendant in a conspiracy case requires that a new trial be granted him, the
rights of his co-defendants to a new trial depend upon
whether that error prejudiced them. 16
This language has been interpreted by later courts' 7 as requiring
a showing of prejudice arising from a conflict of interest, as requiring no showing of prejudice arising from a conflict of interest
once such a conflict exists, and as requiring a strong showing of
actual prejudice. It is not clear from the decision whether the
Court, in its discussion of prejudice, only discussed the presence of
a conflict of interest or the amount of prejudice ensuing from such
a conflict. Later courts have interchanged the terms adding further to the confusion on the issue of whether the defendant must
14.
15.
16.
17.

Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S 60, 76 (1942).
Id. at 75.
Id. at 76.
See notes 55-75 infra and accompanying text.

show that he has been prejudiced by the dual representation before a new trial is granted.18
The Court, in dictum, further stated:
There is yet another consideration. Glasser wished the
benefit of the undivided assistance of counsel of his own
choice. We think that such a desire on the part of an
accused should be respected. Irrespective of any conflict of interest, the additional burden of representing another party may conceivably impair counsel's effectiveness. 9
Since a conflict of interest was present in the Glasser case, later
courts have ignored this dicta and have held that dual representa2°
tion per se is not a violation of an accused's constitutional rights.
Such decisions require a showing of conflict of interest in addition
to dual representation.
WHAT CONSTITUTES A CONFLICT OF INTEREST

Although courts hold that dual representation alone is not a
conflict of interest and that some further conflict of interest is
needed to constitute reversible error, they sharply disagree as to
what further conflict is required.
Courts appear to be split as to whether a potential conflict of interest, other than that involved in the mere fact of dual representation, or conflict in fact is required. In State v. Reppin2' the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated "[w] e think a potential conflict of
interest is not sufficient, and a showing must be made of an actual
conflict. '2 2 On the other hand, in People v. Gallardo23 the California court of appeals noted that "[w] e must also keep in mind
that the law does not require the showing of an actual conflict.
18. See, e.g., United States v. LaVallee, 282 F. Supp. 968 (E.D.N.Y.
1968).
19. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 75 (1942).
20. See, e.g., United States v. Bentvena, 319 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1963):
As the Supreme Court recognized in Glasser, and as the circuits
have recognized since that case was decided, an appellant must
show some conflict of interest between himself and the other
defendants represented by his attorney before he can claim successfully that the joint representation deprived him of his right to
counsel. [citations omitted].
Id. at 937.
21. 35 Wis. 2d 377, 151 N.W.2d 9 (1967).
22. Id. at 382, 151 N.W.2d at 15; see, e.g., State v. Kruchten, 101
Ariz. 186, 417 P.2d 510 (1966):

".

.

. an actual conflict must, in fact, have

existed ..
Id. at 199, 417 P.2d at 523; People v. Chapman, 66 Ill. App.
2d 124, 214 N.E.2d 313 (1965): "It is only when the interests of the joint
defendants are in fact antagonistic that the court must grant separate trials
or require separate representation." Id. at 136, 214 N.E.2d at 315 (emphasis
in original); Commonwealth v. Wilson, 429 Pa. 458, 240 A.2d 498 (1968):
"However, one never reaches this prophylactic rule unless and until the
defendant can demonstrate that a conflict in fact existed at trial." Id. at 463,
240 A.2d at 501.
23. 269 A.C.A. 75, 74 Cal. Rptr. 572 (1969).
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A potential one suffices." 24 Courts, however, differ as to what
constitutes potential or actual conflict. Frequently, what one court
deems a potential conflict will be considered actual conflict by a
different tribunal. The crux of the disagreement between courts,
therefore, is not whether a potential or actual conflict of interest
is needed but simply what constitutes a conflict of interest.
In People v. Odom, 2 5 in summarizing what constitutes a conflict of interest in California, the district court of appeals stated:
Conflicts of interest among codefendants may arise when
it would profit one defendant to attack the credibility of another [citation omitted], when counsel would be restricted
in final summation because he might injure one defendant
by arguments in favor of another [citation omitted], when
one defendant has a record of prior felony convictions and
the others do not [citation omitted], when the defenses of
codefendants are factually inconsistent [citation omitted],
or when appointed counsel believes a conflict of interest
may exist [citation omitted] .2
In Odom the appellant failed to show the existence of any of these
2
conflicts of interest and was not, therefore, entitled to relief. 7
Although, by implication, the court indicated that the conflicts
listed were the only conflicts recognized in California, the list was
soon expanded. In People v. Chacon,28 the California Supreme
Court noted, "[c]onflicts of interest necessarily exist when the
jury must fix the penalty for more than one defendant." 29 In
3 0
People v. Gallardo,
the California court of appeals said "...
the concept of conflict of interest as between defendants represented by one counsel encompasses far more than inconsistent defenses . .

.

. [T] here is a right to separate representations simply

because one defendant is more heavily involved than the others."8 1
California is one of the few states to attempt to list what constitutes a conflict of interest in a dual representation situation. Many
other states lack consistency and agree with some of California's
categories while disagreeing with others.
In California a conflict of interest exists where the co-defend24. Id. at 77, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 575: see, e.g., Pressley v. State, 220 Md.
558, 155 A.2d 494 (1959): "To show prejudice there must be revealed
an actual or imminently potential conflict of interest." Id. at 560, 155 A.2d
at 496.
25.

236 Cal. App. 2d 876, 46 Cal. Rptr. 453 (1965).

26.

Id. at 878, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 454.

27.

Id. at 879, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 454.

28. 69 Cal. 2d 208, 447 P.2d 106, 73 Cal. Rptr. 10 (1968).
29. Id. at 214, 447 P.2d at 112, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 16.
30. 269 A.C.A. 75, 74 Cal. Rptr. 572 (1969).
31. Id. at 77, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 574.

ants have factually inconsistent defenses,3 2 for example, where one
defendant pleads guilty and the other innocent. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held in Commonwealth ex rel. Whitling v.
Russell3 that a conflict exists where each co-defendant pleads differently; one co-defendant who pleaded not guilty had testified
against the other.34 However, in West Virginia in State ex rel.
Favors v. Tucker 35 where one defendant gave a statement to the
police confessing guilt, implicating his co-defendant as his accomplice, and afterwards pleaded guilty testifying at the trial against
his co-defendant who had pleaded not guilty, the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals held that no conflict existed.86
In California a conflict of interest exists where one defendant
is more heavily involved than the other.3 1 Similarly, the District
Court for the District of Columbia3 found a conflict where the
case against one defendant was stronger. The Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts, 39 however, came to the opposite conclusion
in stating that "[t] he fact that the case against one defendant may
have been stronger would not make their position at trial incon4 0

sistent."

Where one defendant implicates his co-defendant while exculpating himself, the majority of courts agree that a conflict of interest exists. 41 In Sawyer v. Brough4 2 the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that "[a]n obvious divergence of interest exists between a defendant who denies his guilt and a co-defendant who
not only confesses his own complicity but also accuses the other
of participation in the crime.143 This theory was not followed in
Kacymarek v. State44 where one co-defendant testified that he had
no idea that the burglary was to take place and that it was entirely his co-defendant's idea. The Wisconsin Supreme Court found
no conflict, although it recognized that "[c]ounsel's plea tended to
exculpate Hull [co-defendant] and inculpate the defendant.' 4 5 In
32. People v. Odom, 236 Cal. App. 2d 876, 46 Cal. Rptr. 453 (1965).
33. 406 Pa. 43, 45, 176 A.2d 641, 643 (1962).
34. See, e.g., People v. Ware, 39 Ill. 2d 47, 233 N.E.2d 421 (1968);
State v. Ebinger, 97 N.J. Super. 23, 234 A.2d 233 (1967).
35. 143 W.V. 130, 136, 100 S.E.2d 411, 417 (1948).
36. See, e.g., State v. Oldham, 438 P.2d 275 (Idaho 1968); Mueller v.
State, 32 Wis. 2d 70, 145 N.W.2d 84 (1966).
37. People v. Odom, 236 Cal. App. 2d 876, 46 Cal. Rptr. 453 (1965).
38. Campbell v. United States, 353 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
39. Englehart v. Commonwealth, 353 Mass. 561, 233 N.E.2d 737, cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 886 (1968).
40. Id. at 567, 233 N.E.2d at 738; see, e.g., Holloway v. State, 32 Wis.
2d 559, 146 N.W.2d 144 (1966).
41. See, e.g., White v. United States, 396 F.2d 822 (5th Cir. 1968);
United States ex rel. Watson v. Myers, 250 F. Supp. 292 (E.D. Pa. 1966);
Wright v. Johnson, 77 F. Supp. 687 (N.D. Cal. 1948); State v. Montgomery,
182 Neb. 737, 157 N.W.2d 196 (1968).
42. 358 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1966).
43. Id. at 73.
44. 38 Wis. 2d 71, 155 N.W.2d 813 (1968).
45. Id. at 76, 155 N.W.2d at 818.
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Commonwealth v. Resinger,46 two co-defendants were represented
by the same counsel in a murder trial. Each defendant had confessed guilt and had incriminated the other but had put the greatest blame on a third party. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
found no conflict.47
Where one defendant implicates his co-defendant while not
trying to exculpate himself, courts are in disagreement as to
49
48
whether a conflict exists. Arizona found a conflict while Illinois
found none. In a recent decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
5
was split on a similar issue. In Commonwealth v. Small " one codefendant had implicated appellant in both his confession and in
testimony at the trial. Chief Justice Bell, writing an opinion supporting the affirmation of the conviction, found no conflict since
appellant had admitted in testimony what his co-defendant had
previously implicated, the co-defendants had relied on the same de51
fense, and no conflicting or antagonistic testimony was offered.
Justice Roberts, in dissent, believed that ". . . in a dual representation situation where codefendant implicates the appellant in both
his confession and trial testimony, such a potential for conflict
must exist. ' 52 Justice Roberts was apparently concerned with the
means of arriving at a trial strategy, that is, with any possible influence the co-defendant's implicating confession might have had on
the formulation of counsel's trial strategy. The Chief Justice, on
the other hand, considered only the end result-the actual trial
presentation.
In Peek v. United States 3 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit said:
It is well recognized in the federal courts that the existence
46. 432 Pa. 398, 348 A.2d 55 (1968).
47. Id. at 401, 348 A.2d at 56, Justice Roberts filed a dissenting
opinion in which Justice Eagen joined contending that counsel was hampered in formulating trial strategy. Id. at 401, 348 A.2d at 56.
48. State v. Coleman, 9 Ariz. App. 526, 454 P.2d 196 (1969).
49. People v. VanHyming, 72 Ill. App. 2d 168, 219 N.E.2d 268 (1966).
50. 434 Pa. 497, 254 A.2d 509 (1969) (per curiam, the court being
equally divided the judgment of sentence was affirmed). Appellant and
two co-defendants were tried together on various charges including assault
and battery, indecent assault, aggravated assault and battery, assault
and battery with intent to ravish, rape, sodomy, and corrupting the morals
of a minor child. One co-defendant was acquitted on all counts, the other
co-defendant was found guilty on all counts; appellant was found guilty
on all charges except assault. At the trial all three defendnts were represented by the same court-appointed counsel.
51. Id. at 502, 254 A.2d at 510.
52. Id. at 504, 254 A.2d at 511 (emphasis in original).
53. 321 F.2d 934 (9th Cir. 1963).

of a conflict of interest on the part of counsel representing
two different defendants deprives the accused of the effective assistance of counsel; decisions dealing with the
question of whether or not a conflict of interest existed4
have turned on the particular fact situation of each case.
It should be noted, however, that regardless of the language in
Peek, the federal and state cases discussed here cannot be distinguished on their facts. They represent different views by different courts on the same issue in practically the same fact situation.
To advocate that conflict of interest in each case be decided on
the facts of the case with no uniform guidelines upon which to
make such a determination is skirting the problem. To permit each
judge to determine whether a conflict exists can only perpetuate
confusion and further contribute to injustice. It is submitted that
a defendant in one state should not fare differently than a defendant in another state under identical fact situations.
IF A CONFLICT OF INTEREST DOES ARISE MUST PREJUDICE ENSUE BEFORE
THE DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS HAvE BEEN VIOLATED

If a court finds a conflict, a defendant may, alternatively, be
granted a new trial or be required to prove that he has been prejudiced. The result depends upon the jurisdiction in which the case
is being tried. This dichotomy is a product of different interpretations of Glasser on the subject of prejudice.
5
In Commonwealth ex rel. Whitling v. Russell,"
appellant,
Richard Whitling, and his brother, Ralph Whitling, were tried and
convicted upon the charge of sodomy. The trial court appointed
the same counsel to represent appellant's brother as had been retained by appellant. Appellant pleaded not guilty and testified
at the trial that his brother was guilty. On appeal the Superior
Court of Pennsylvania recognized that there was a conflict of
interest but refused to reverse since appellant had not shown
that ".

.

. the conflict in interest resulted in such ineffective and

improper representation as to result in basic and fundamental
error." 56 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed and established what has since been called the "prophylactic rule. '5 7 As
stated by the court, the prophylactic rule is as follows:
If, in the representation of more than one defendant, a
conflict of interest arises, the mere existence of such a conflict vitiates the proceedings, even though no actual harm
results. The potentiality that such harm may result rather
than that such harm did result furnishes the appropriate
criterion.

8

54. Id. at 944.
55. 406 Pa. 45, 176 A.2d 641 (1962).
56. Commonwealth ex rel. Whitling v. Russell, 195 Pa. Super. 277,
280, 171 A.2d 819, 821 (1961), rev'd, 406 Pa. 45, 176 A.2d 641 (1962).
57. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Small, 434 Pa. 497, 254 A.2d 509 (1969).
58. Commonwealth ex rel. Whitling v. Russell, 406 Pa. 45, 48, 176 A.2d
641, 643 (1962) (emphasis in original).
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The court was concerned with the prevention of possible harm
rather than remediation of actual wrong.59 The court reasoned
that it could not say whether appellant's counsel had been ineffective but questioned whether he could have been more effective
had he not been burdened by representing two defendants with
conflicting positions.6" Thus, the court held that the mere presence
of a conflict of interest warrants judicial correction of the situation
without need for the defendant to prove that he had been prejudiced by the dual representation. 1
In Penn v. Smyth62 the appellant testified that he took no
part in the robberies for which he was charged. His co-defendants,
however, testified that appellant had initiated the robberies, and,
at the point of a gun, compelled them to assist in the perpetration
of the crime. The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals ruled:
[T] he mere fact that counsel employed and chosen by petitioner also was retained by and represented codefendants
with conflicting interests does not compel a conclusion
that the petitioner was prejudiced thereby, and certainly
not to such an extent as to oust the jurisdiction of the trial
court and render the proceeding therein a nullity.6s
The dual interpretation of the holding in Glasser is particularly
64
evident in federal courts. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals,
citing Glasser, concluded that ".

.

. there is no need on the part

of a defendant to show that he has been prejudiced by the multiple
representation."65 Taking the opposite interpretation, the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals, 66 also citing Glasser, held: "We read
this language as requiring a showing of prejudice against the party
'67
claiming deprivation of Sixth Amendment rights.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See, e.g., State v. Krutchen, 101 Ariz. 186, 417 P.2d 510 (1966);
People v. Chacon, 73 Cal. Rptr. 10, 447 P.2d 106 (1968); State v. Ebinger,
97 N.J. Super. 23, 234 A.2d 233 (1967); State v. Tapia, 75 N.M. 757, 411
P.2d 234 (1966).
All the above cited cases rely on Glasser v. United
States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
62. 188 Va. 367, 49 S.E.2d 600 (1948).
63. Id. at 374, 49 S.E.2d at 603; see, e.g., People v. McCasle, 35 Ill. 2d
552, 221 N.E.2d 227 (1966); State v. Robinson, 271 Minn. 548, 136 N.W.2d
401 (1965).
64. United States v. Gougis, 374 F.2d 758 (7th Cir. 1967).
65. Id. at 761; see, e.g., Sawyer v. Brough, 358 F.2d 70, 73 (4th Cir.
1966); Craig v. United States, 217 F.2d 355, 359 (6th Cir. 1954); United
States ex rel. Platts v. Myers, 253 F. Supp. 23, 25 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
66. United States v. Burkeen, 355 F.2d 241 (6th Cir. 1966).
67. Id. at 241; see, e.g., Fryar v. United States, 404 F.2d 1071 (10th Cir.
1968); Lugo v. United States, 350 F.2d 858, 859 (9th Cir. 1965); Lott v.
United States, 218 F.2d 675, 681 (5th Cir. 1955).

The District of Columbia Circuit, in Lollar v. United States,es
recognized the divergent views as to whether prejudice must be
shown, and noted that no circuit court had developed a standard
upon which a decision could be made. The court interpreted
Glasser as requiring a showing of prejudice though not the exact
degree of prejudice:
The obvious reason against insisting on a precise delineation of the prejudice suffered is that such a task is made
very difficult when one must rely on a cold, printed record
for reconstruction of the manifold and complex dynamics of
the trial process, including reasons for trial tactics which
may have been dictated by the joint representation. Like
the famous tip of the iceberg, the record may not reveal
the whole story. Apparently minor instances in the record
which suggest co-defendants' conflicting interests may
well be the tell-tale signs of deeper conflict. 69
Despite this language, the District of Columbia court adopted a
standard dependent on the record:
Because of this, and because of the fundamental nature of
the right involved, when there are indications in the record
that stir doubts about the effectiveness of joint representation, those doubts should be resolved in favor of the de70
fendant ....
The court concluded that

"...

only where we can find no basis

in the record for an informed speculation that appellant's rights
were prejudicially affected, can the conviction stand."' 71 The court
then clarified the standard: "In effect, we adopt the standard of
'reasonable doubt' ...
While Pennsylvania and other states with similar views will
reverse upon discovering the existence of a conflict, such as antagonistic defenses, without any showing of prejudice, a court following
Lolar will search the record to determine if an appellant's rights
were prejudiced, however slightly. Because Lollar required a
showing of prejudice, Chief Judge Bazelon dissented saying:
If this were a case of first impression I would seriously
consider reversing the conviction without any showing of
prejudice.
[H]owever, the present rule requires a showing of
prejudice, and, although73this is not an easy case, I do not
think prejudice appears.
74
The District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
also recognized the danger of relying upon the record to deter68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

1966).

376 F.2d 243 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
Id. at 246.
Id. at 247.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 248.
United States ex rel. Miller v. Myers, 253 F. Supp. 55 (E.D. Pa.
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mine whether a defendant was prejudiced by a conflict of interest.
The court, however, came to a 'different conclusion than that of
Lollar:
This situation is too fraught with the danger of prejudice,
prejudice which the cold record might not indicate, that
the mere existence of the conflict is sufficient to constitute
a violation of relator's rights whether or not it
75 in fact
influences the attorney or the outcome of the case.
These divergent views cannot be distinguished on the basis of
the facts of the case. Courts which require no showing of prejudice
once it appears an accused was represented by counsel with conflicting interests have, it is submitted, the better view.
WHAT ARE THE RESPECTIVE ROLES OF THE ACCUSED, COUNSEL, TRIAL
JUDGE AND APPELLATE-LEVEL COURTS IN LITIGATING
THE ISSUE OF CONFLICT OF INTERESTS
Courts have frequently taken divergent positions on the ques-

tion, who must discover whether a conflict of interest initially exists. A number of courts 76 hold that it is the trial court's duty
to discover whether a conflict of interest exists or might possibly
arise, to advise the defendants of their right to separate counsel
if a conflict does arise, and to warn the defendants of the dangers
involved in proceeding with the same counsel if that is their desire.
Courts of this view do not hold against a defendant his failure to
object to the dual representation or the raising of the issue for the
first time on appeal.
In Campbell v. United States7 7 co-defendants were represented
by the same counsel. The issue of a conflict of interest was raised
on appeal and the court of appeals for the District of Columbia,
relying on Glasser, concluded:
The judge's responsibility is not necessarily discharged by
simply accepting the co-defendants' designation of a single

attorney to represent them both. An individual defendant
is rarely sophisticated enough to evaluate the potential
conflicts, and when two defendants appear with a single

attorney it cannot be determined, absent inquiry by the
trial judge, whether the attorney has made
such an ap78
praisal or has advised his clients of the risks.
75. Id. at 57; see United States v. LaVallee, 282 F. Supp. 968 (E.D.N.Y.
1968): "It is inherent in such a case that many intangibles might
intervene which would deprive a defendant of a fair trial without it being
apparent on the record." Id. at 974.
76. See notes 77-87 infra and accompanying text.
77. 352 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
78. Id. at 360.

The court was concerned with the constitutional rights of the defendants and the effective administration of justice. The duty of
the trial judge according to the Campbell court includes an appraisal of defendant's decision to proceed with the same attorney.
That decision must be intelligently made and cannot be the product
79
of poverty or ignorance.
In Lollar v. United Statess° the court of appeals for the District
of Columbia noted that in Campbell counsel had been retained by
co-defendants rather than appointed by the trial court. However,
the court, in relying on Campbell and Glasser, concluded that:
[W] e see no reason why in assigned-counsel cases the responsibility to advise defendants of their rights and the
potential problems of joint representation should be any
less than where counsel is retained. Quite the contrary.
Not only does the Criminal Justice Act indicate otherwise,
but the indigent is entitled to assume that the court, in
actively aiding him in obtaining counsel, will advise him
of all
rights and matters relevant to appointment of coun81
sel.

The court reasoned that the risks involved in joint representation
are the same whether counsel is retained or appointed and that a
defendant, regardless of his economic position, should be warned
of such dangers in order that he may take whatever steps necessary
2
to avoid them.
In addition to advising a defendant of "all" his rights and warning him of the dangers of proceeding with joint counsel, these
courts place upon the trial judge even further positive duties. In
Morgan v. United States s 3 the second circuit court concluded that
in multi-defendant cases the assignment of counsel should never
be done routinely and held that:
Where the trial judge assigns the same attorney to represent two or more defendants, he should do so only after
conducting the most careful inquiry as to which a full
record should be made, and after satisfying himself that
no conflict of interest is likely to result
and that the
84
parties involved have no valid objection.
Furthermore, the duty on the trial judge to thoroughly search for
a possible conflict of interest before appointing counsel is not limited to the counsel's statement as to the absence of a conflict of
interest. In Sawyer v. Broughs5 the court-appointed counsel testified before the trial that he did not feel any conflict of interest
existed between the co-defendants. However, the fourth circuit
court on appeal held that
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

"...

we cannot, on the mere strength of

Id. at 361.
376 F.2d 243 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
Id. at 245 (emphasis by the court).
Id. at 246.
396 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1968).
Id. at 114.
358 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1966).
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the attorney's testimony, dismiss as without merit Sawyer's claim
that the right of effective representation has been denied him."'8 6
The court found that a conflict had existed and reversed. In People v. Gallardo 7 one defendant was charged with six felonies while
his co-defendant was charged with only three. The public defender
informed the trial judge that although both co-defendants thought
a conflict of interest existed he didn't believe any conflict existed.
On appeal the California court of appeals concluded:
Two matters stand out: first, at no time were either
Gallardo or Ruiz advised of the various situations which
would entitle them to separate representation. Therefore
any failure to verbalize a request for separate counsel correctly and to give adequate reasons for it cannot be held
against them on appeal.
Second, while the public defender's good faith is not
doubted in the least, he was simply wrong when he in88
formed the court that there was no conflict.
In refusing to rely on counsel's determination that no conflict existed, the Gallardo court reasoned that where one defendant is
more heavily involved than the other, counsel, regardless of his
good faith, cannot adequately represent both defendants. The
court decided that in such a situation separate counsel must be
appointed."9
A number of courts9" do not agree that the positive duty of
advising and warning the defendant should be placed on the trial
judge. Instead, this second category of courts places the positive
duty on the defendant. Courts of the second category require
that the defendant must bring to the court's attention the presence
of a conflict of interest, holding against a defendant his failure to
object to the dual representation, that the court does not have to
warn defendants of any dangers involved in proceeding with the
same counsel, and that the court is not required to inquire if defendant's decision to proceed with the same counsel was intelligently made. These courts base their views on the fact that in
Glasser counsel brought to the court's attention the possibility of a
conflict of interest and that both Glasser and his counsel had initially objected to the dual representation.
86. Id. at 73.
87. 269 A.C.A. 75, 74 Cal. Rptr. 572 (1969).
88. Id. at 77, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 574; see, e.g., United States v. Goughis,
374 F.2d 758 (7th Cir. 1967); Shuttle v. Smith, 296 F. Supp. 1315 (D. Vermont 1969); State v. Tapia, 75 N.M. 757, 411 P.2d 234 (1966).
89. People v. Gallardo, 269 A.C.A. 75, 78, 74 Cal. Rptr. 572, 575 (1969).
90. See notes 91-99 infra and accompanying text.

In Lott v. United States0 ' the defendant relied on Glasser for
his appeal. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled:
. . . Glasser was deprived of his right, under the Sixth

Amendment, to the assistance of counsel where the court,
over objection, required his counsel to represent a codefendant with notice that their interests might be in
conflict. Here there was neither objection, claim, nor notice to the court of any alleged conflict between the interests of the three defendants. .

.

. [T] herefore.

.

.there

was no denial of their92 constitutional right to the effective
assistance of counsel.
In People v. Chapman9 8 the defendant contended that at least his
consent to the dual representation should have been obtained. The
Illinois appellate court said: "The record indicates, however, that
the defendant was present during all the proceedings and was
aware of the circumstances, yet did not object, or request other
94
counsel. He cannot now complain.
In State v. Bomar9" the Tennessee Supreme Court recognized
that an attorney should not represent conflicting interests. However, relying on Glasser,it stated that:
It is true where there is a conflict of interest between
two or more defendants this should be borne in mind by
the trial judge, and separate counsel appointed. However,
to take advantage of the conflict of interest rule, that fact
should be brought to the attention of the trial court.9 6
In Juvera v. United States97 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that it was not necessary under the sixth amendment that
• ..the trial judge at the commencement of the trial discuss with defendants the problems relating to representation of the several defendants by one counsel, pointing
out to them the disadvantage that might arise should there
be conflicting interests to be represented by the attorney.9
The same court had concluded in an earlier case 99 that, since an
attorney is an officer of the court, the court must be allowed to
rely on the attorney's determination as to the presence or absence
00
of a conflict of interest without any need of further inquiry.
Regardless of whether a court places the duty on the defendant or on the trial court to determine if a conflict of interest does
or will exist, the problems involved in making such a determina91. 218 F.2d 675 (5th Cir. 1955).
92. Id. at 681.
93. 66 Ill. App. 2d 124, 214 N.E.2d 313 (1965).
94. Id. at 126, 214 N.E.2d at 315.
95. 201 Tenn. 453, 300 S.W.2d 875 (1957).
96. Id. at 454, 300 S.W.2d at 876.
97. 378 F.2d 433 (9th Cir. 1967).
98. Id. at 437.
99. Lugo v. United States, 350 F.2d 858 (9th Cir. 1965).
100. Id. at 860; see, e.g., Mohler v. United States, 312 F.2d 228 (7th
Cir. 1963); State v. Robinson, 271 Minn. 477, 136 N.W.2d 401 (1965); Massey
v. State, 28 Wis. 2d 376, 137 N.W.2d 69 (1968).
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tion are great. A few months after Lollar was decided, the appeal
of Lollar's co-defendant on the same issue of a conflict of interest
came before the court in Ford v. United States.'0' The court noted
that the Criminal Justice Act requires that ".

.

. the court shall

appoint separate counsel for defendants who have such conflicting
interests that they cannot properly be represented by the same
counsel ....-102 Realizing the difficulties in determining whether
a conflict exists the court held:
Under the circumstances we have concluded that, in order
to comply with the Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006
A(b); as well as the teaching of Glasser, Campbell, and
Lollar, hereafter separate counsel for each co-defendant
should be appointed initially in every case with an instruction that if counsel conclude, after fully investigating
the case, and consulting with their clients, that the interests of justice and of the clients will best be served by
joint representation, this conclusion with supporting reasons shall be communicated to the court for such on-therecord disposition as the court deems appropriate in the
circumstances.10 3
In Lollar v. United States'0 4 Chief Judge Bazelon had dissented
expressing the need for an absolute rule requiring separate counsel:
An absolute rule requiring separate lawyers (unless there
is an intelligent waiver) would free this court from the
impossible task of speculating about what might have happened at a trial in which each defendant had his own lawyer. And it would free the trial judge, who must decide
how many lawyers to appoint, from guessing before the
trial whether something at the trial would indicate to us
a conflict of interest among the defendants. 10 5
In Ford v. United States'0 6 the court established the rule that
counsel should0 7 be appointed initially in every case. Hence, it
will not constitute reversible error per se when a trial judge fails
to follow these instructions. Thus, in such a situation, the court
on appeal will again have to indulge in "speculation"'' 08 as to
whether the appellant has been prejudiced. 1 9 Since Chief Judge
101. 379 F.2d 123 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
102. Id. at 125 (quoting the CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A
(b) (1964) (emphasis by the court).
103. Ford v. United States, 379 F.2d 123, 125 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (emphasis
added).
104. Lollar v. United States, 376 F.2d 243 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
105. Id. at 248.
106. 379 F.2d 123 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
107. Id. at 125.
108. Lollar v. United States, 376 F.2d 243, 247 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
109.

Ford v. United States, 379 F.2d 123 (D.C. Cir. 1967):

"...

we

are not persuaded that all consideration of prejudice is irrelevant where
co-defendants are represented by the same counsel." Id. at 125.

Bazelon was against any showing of prejudice and in favor of an
absolute rule requiring separate counsel, he again dissented. 110
Nevertheless, although the court did not go far enough, it has
taken an important step in the right direction.
EXISTING STANDARDS

At present there are no guidelines for determining what constitutes a conflict of interest. Each state and federal district has
determined from the facts in the case before it whether or not
a conflict of interest exists. In spite of that fact, it appears that
a conflict of interest exists where the defenses of co-defendants are
antagonistic or where one co-defendant attempts to exculpate himself at the expense of his co-defendant. However, due to a lack of
realistic guidelines, courts have not been unanimous in finding a
conflict of interest in such situations.'
The many situations which
give rise to a conflict of interest, and which cannot be anticipated,
point to the impracticality of formulating or attempting to formulate a standard.
If a conflict of interest is found, courts are in sharp disagreement as to the need for any further judicial determination. Courts
which require a showing of prejudice, though they do not expressly state their reasons for such a position, evidently believe
that if no apparent harm comes to a defendant from sharing his
counsel with that of a co-defendant the state need not go to the
expense and waste of time in granting a new trial, particularly
112
where the evidence pointing to the appellant's guilt is strong.
Other courts require no showing of prejudice. Courts of this
view reason that where important constitutional rights are involved, such as the right to the effective assistance of counsel, it is
not for the court to indulge in "speculation" 11 3 as to whether
a defendant has been prejudiced by the violation of such right." 4
Where an accused has not been given his "Miranda"' 115 warnings
before making a confession and the confession has been admitted
as evidence, there is reversible error per se regardless of whether
110. Id. at 126.
111. See notes 25-53 supra and accompanying text.
112. See generally notes 63, 67 supra.
113. Lollar v. United States, 376 F.2d 243, 247 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
114. See, e.g., Morgan v. United States, 396 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1968),
where the court stated:
We are aware of the seeming waste of time and expense which
would be involved in the retrial of a defendant, at a time after
he has served his sentence, on charges where the record provides
such strong evidence of guilt. However, the effective assistance of
counsel is so important and paramount a right for a defendant on
trial for a serious crime that we are not entitled to assume, merely
because there is such substantial support for the conviction, that
the defendant was in fact, adequately represented by counsel.
Id. at 114.
- 115. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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defendant has been prejudiced thereby and regardless of the
strength of the indicators of guilt. The right to the "effective"
assistance of counsel guaranteed by the sixth amendment is clearly
of equal importance as the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination. When it appears an accused has been represented by
counsel with conflicting interests, a new trial should be granted
without requiring a showing of prejudice.
The jurisdictions, such as Pennsylvania, which do not require
a showing of prejudice once a conflict exists, realize the importance
of guarding an accused's right to the effective assistance of counsel.
However, both views have one common, unrealistic procedure. To
determine if a conflict of interest existed, or if a defendant suffered any prejudice therefrom, the courts, of necessity, have only
the record from which to judge. The record, however, seldom
gives a complete picture. On the record it may appear that defendants did not have antagonistic defenses and that defendants
did not give conflicting testimony. It may further appear that
counsel cross-examined all witnesses. What the record does not,
and cannot, indicate, however, are counsel's reasons for his trial
strategy. The strategy, of necessity, cannot be formulated with
the exclusive interests of one client in mind. Yet, if an accused
is entitled to counsel, he should be entitled to be represented by
counsel who has only accused's interests in mind.11 6
Courts, which require defendant to bring to the court's attention any possible conflict of interest and to request separate counsel, are unrealistic in imparting to a defendant the sophistication
necessary to competently decide such a question."17 Often a conflict will not become apparent until the trial has significantly progressed, and, hence, to hold against a defendant his failure to object to the dual representation at the beginning of the trial is
obviously unjust.
Courts which require the trial judge to determine that no conflict exists before appointing counsel have, it is submitted, the better view. Yet this standard is also unrealistic. Although a trial
judge has far greater sophistication and experience than a defendant in determining such matters, he cannot possibly predict with
complete accuracy the course a trial will take, nor can he foresee
what testimony will be given by witnesses which would require
vigorous, unhampered cross-examination.
The courts have been unanimous in holding that dual repre116.
117.

Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70 (1942).
See note 78 supra.

sentation per se is not a conflict of interest and is therefore not a
violation of an accused's constitutional rights." 8 Yet what must
be recognized is that, if a single counsel is appointed to represent
more than one defendant in a criminal case, the possibility that
such a situation will develop into a potential or actual conflict of
interest is a very real one. The American Bar Association recognized this in its new CODE OF PROFESSIONAL ET4ICS: 119
A lawyer should never represent in litigation multiple
clients with differing interests; and there are few situations in which he would be justified in representing in
litigation
multiple clients with potentially differing in20 o
terests.
:::.Typically recurring situations involving potentially
differing interests are those in which a lawyer is asked to
121
represent co-defendants in a criminal case ....
Regardless of how harmonious the situation appears before
trial, the possibility of a conflict is always present where two defendants are represented by the same counsel. 22 A defense counsel's strategy is dictated by the fact that he is representing two or
more defendants accused of the same crime. He must decide
whether all or one or none of his clients should take the stand.
This decision is influenced by the risk that the defendants' stories
will be conflicting or that one defendant will disclose new matter
which would have an adverse affect on his co-defendant. If one
defendant wishes to take the stand while his co-defendant does not,
this may possibly have an adverse affect on the jury's opinion of
the defendant who chooses not to testify. Counsel will be further
hampered in cross-examination where he must constantly be aware
of any effect such cross-examination will have on the other defendant(s). He runs the risk in cross-examining a witness of
bringing out testimony prejudicial to one defendant yet realizes
that such cross-examination is needed to defend one co-defendant.
Furthermore, though counsel is permitted to cross-examine a codefendant, such cross-examination cannot be effective when counsel is thinking of his other client's interests at the same time.
Where one defendant is more heavily involved than his co-defendant, or even if equally involved yet one has a prior record while
the other does not, counsel will be tempted to settle for a deal
118. See note 20 supra.
119. A.B.A. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY No. 5 (1969).
120. Id., Ethical Consideration 5-15, at 60 (footnote omitted).
121. Id., Ethical Consideration 5-17, at 61; see, e.g., People v. Baker,
268 A.C.A. 277, 73 Cal. Rptr. 758 (1969): "... it seems to be a rare appeal

in a criminal case where two defendants are jointly tried and represented

by one attorney, that the question of separate representation does not become an issue." Id. at 282, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 763; Morgan v. United States,
396 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1968): ". . . the possibility of a conflict of interest

between two defendants is almost always present to some degree ......
Id. at 114.
122. Morgan v. United States, 396 F.2d 110, 114 (2d Cir. 1968).
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favoring the lesser involved defendant or for a sentence favoring
the defendant with an unblemished record. Hence, where counsel
is appointed to represent more than one defendant in a criminal
case he is faced with a potentially unresolvable situation.
CONCLUSION

The United States Supreme Court in Glasser v. United States
recognized that "[i] rrespective of any conflict of interest, the additional burden of representing another party may conceivably impair counsel's effectiveness.' 1 23 The courts that have followed this
decision have chosen to ignore this warning, creating the present
confusing and unjust situation. The right of an accused to be
represented by counsel has been continually expanded, and with
this expansion an increasing possibility of a conflict of interest has
developed when the court appoints the same counsel to represent
more than one defendant. In light of the volume of litigation on
conflicts of interest in dual representation in recent years, Glasser's warning can no longer be ignored.
A binding rule requiring that separate counsel be appointed
initially for each defendant, unless after such appointment both
the defendants, court-appointed counsels, and trial judge agree that
dual representation would benefit all involved, would eliminate
the existing problems which arise when the court appoints one
counsel to represent more than one defendant, free the already
clogged courts from needless, costly appeals, 124 and serve to protect
an accused's constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel.
RICHARD R. ISAACSON

123. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 75 (1942).
124 See, e.g., Lucas v. Druggan, 212 Pa. Super. 478, 243 A.2d 184
(1968) (dissenting opinion):
...it is the rare case in which counsel can adequately represent
more than one defendant and that courts should be most hesitant
in allowing this. In such circumstances the loss of time and expense to all parties and the Commonwealth far exceeds whatever
minor savings are obtained by allowing multiple representation
of defendants.
Id. at 482, 243 A.2d at 186; People v. Baker, 268 A.C.A. 277, 73 Cal. Rptr.
758 (1969): "There is no question in our minds that if we compare the
cost of obtaining separate representation for [the defendant] against the
total cost of this appeal and the retrial, the former will seem small indeed." Id. at 282, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 763.

